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Consciousness of Attitudes
Abstract: Suppose we know our own attitudes, e.g. judgments and
decisions, only by unconsciously interpreting ourselves. Would this
undermine the assumption that there are conscious attitudes?
Carruthers (2011) has argued that if the mentioned view of self-
knowledge is combined with either of the two most common
approaches to consciousness, i.e. the higher-order state account
(Rosenthal, 1997; 2005; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000) or the
global workspace theory (Baars, 1988; Dehaene and Naccache,
2001), then the conjunction of these theories implies that there are no
conscious attitudes. I shall show that Carruthers’ argument against
the existence of conscious attitudes doesn’t succeed, and mention
studies on autism and logical reasoning under cognitive load that
suggest that there are conscious attitudes.
Does the way we know our own attitudes, e.g. judgments and deci-
sions, undermine the view that there are conscious attitudes?
Peter Carruthers (2011) has made a powerful case for the view that
we know our own attitudes only by means of an unconscious process
of self-interpretation.1 He contends furthermore that if this view of
self-knowledge is combined with either of the two most common
approaches to consciousness, i.e. the higher-order state account (e.g.
Rosenthal, 1997; 2005; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000) or the global
workspace theory (e.g. Baars, 1988; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001),
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[1] Carruthers excludes ‘sensorily-embedded judgments’ (e.g. seeing as, or hearing as) and
affective ‘context-bound’ desires and emotions from this claim (Carruthers, 2011, p. 10).
The qualification should be kept in mind throughout this paper. See Carruthers (2011, pp.
2ff.) for details on these two exceptions.
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then the conjunction of these theories implies that there are no con-
scious attitudes.2
In the following, I shall show that Carruthers’ argument against the
existence of conscious attitudes doesn’t succeed, and mention studies
on autism and logical reasoning under cognitive load that suggest that
there are conscious attitudes.
Since Carruthers’ case against conscious attitudes rests on his spe-
cific account of self-knowledge, I begin in Section 1 with a brief expo-
sition of the latter before in Section 2 introducing and critiquing his
case. In Sections 3 and 4, I then offer two arguments for conscious
attitudes.
1. On Self-Knowledge of Attitudes
How do we know our own attitudes? It seems that while we know
other people’s mental states only by observation and interpretation of
their behaviour, we know our own attitudes directly, i.e. without inter-
preting ourselves or circumstances (see, for example, Shoemaker,
1996; Nichols and Stich, 2003; Goldman, 2006). However, psycholo-
gists (e.g. Gopnik, 1993; Gazzaniga, 1995; Wegner, 2002; Wilson,
2002; Bem, 1967; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1994; Frith and Happé, 1999)
and philosophers (e.g. Ryle, 1948; Dennett, 1991; Lawlor, 2008;
2009) alike have challenged this view. Most recently, Carruthers
(2011) has put forward a detailed empirically oriented argument
against it.
He holds that if subjects had direct self-knowledge of attitudes then
there shouldn’t be cases where they unknowingly confabulate atti-
tudes for their own behaviour. But he points out that various psycho-
logical studies show that there are. For instance, in experimental
settings, subjects unconsciously confabulated decisions for their own
actions after the latter occurred (Gazzaniga, 1995; Johansson et al.,
2006) and even though they didn’t perform the actions themselves
(Wegner and Wheatley, 1999) or voluntarily (Brasil-Neto et al.,
1992).
Furthermore, Carruthers continues, if subjects knew their own atti-
tudes directly then self-interpretation shouldn’t unbeknownst to them
affect their self-ascriptions of attitudes. But he holds that again a num-
ber of studies show that it does. It has been found, for instance, that
interpretation of one’s own body posture (Briñol et al., 2009) and
body movements (e.g. head-nodding) affects self-ascriptions of atti-
tudes (Briñol and Petty, 2003).
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[2] In Section 2 I will say more on what is meant by ‘conscious’ in this paper.
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Carruthers argues that given these (and many more) findings on
confabulation of attitudes and self-interpretation, the intuition that we
have non-interpretive self-knowledge of attitudes is undermined. The
reason is that the subjects in the mentioned studies were unaware of
confabulating attitudes and interpreting themselves. From the first-
person point of view, it can thus seem as if one knows one’s own atti-
tudes without interpreting oneself even when self-interpretation or
confabulation of attitudes occurs. The intuition that one has direct
self-knowledge of attitudes is hence in need for support.
Carruthers holds that the empirical data and various theoretical
considerations (drawn, for example, from the global workspace the-
ory, accounts of sensory-based working memory, and evolutionary
theories on meta-representation, see Carruthers, 2011, pp. 48ff.) sup-
port an alternative view, what he calls an ‘interpretive sensory access’
or ‘ISA’ theory of self-knowledge. According to the ISA theory, there
is no principled difference between self-knowledge of attitudes and
knowledge of other people’s mental states. Rather, in both cases,
knowledge of attitudes is interpretive in nature and the result of the
operation of the same cognitive system, the mindreading faculty,
which, based on observation and interpretation of a subject, issues
judgments about that subject’s mental states. Unlike in the case of
knowledge of others’ mental states, however, in one’s own case, the
mindreading faculty can access more information for its interpreta-
tion. In addition to overt behaviour and a subject’s circumstances, it
can also utilize a subject’s affective, sensory and, in particular,
imagistic states (e.g. visual imagery, or ‘inner speech’).
For the purpose of this paper, I shall assume that the ISA theory is
correct. What I want to focus on is Carruthers’ case against conscious
attitudes.
2. Theories of Consciousness and the
Case Against Conscious Attitudes
Carruthers holds that ‘there are two broad possibilities for accounting
for the conscious status of propositional attitudes’: these are either the
‘higher-order state approach’ or the ‘global workspace theory’
(Carruthers, 2011, p. 374). He claims that given this ‘disjunction of
possible accounts of attitude consciousness…, the ISA theory entails’
that there are no conscious attitudes3 (ibid., p. 378).
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[3] Recall that the exceptions are ‘sensorily-embedded judgments’ and ‘context-bound
desires and emotions. These are globally broadcast and transparently accessible to the
mindreading system’ (Carruthers, 2011, p. 378).
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Before getting into the details of Carruthers’ argument a clarifica-
tion is in order, for a state’s being conscious can mean at least two dif-
ferent things. It can mean the state’s being phenomenally conscious,
which involves its having experiential properties or a ‘what-it’s-like-
ness’ (e.g. it is like something to smell fresh coffee, feel pain, etc.); or
it can mean the state’s being access conscious, which needn’t involve
its having experiential properties but only requires that the state be
broadcast for reasoning, action planning, and verbal report (see
Block, 2002).
Both the higher-order state approach and the global workspace the-
ory are often taken to be accounts of phenomenally conscious states.
But some theorists might reject this view and hold that, for instance,
the global workspace theory accounts at best for access conscious
states.
In what follows nothing hinges on this issue, for whatever kind of
consciousness one takes the two approaches to explain, Carruthers’
claim is that these approaches preclude the existence of conscious atti-
tudes if attitudes are only known interpretively. I shall show that, no
matter what kind of consciousness is at issue, this is not the case. I
begin by introducing and critiquing his argument with respect to the
higher-order state approach before turning to the global workspace
theory.
2.1. The higher-order state approach
According to the higher-order state approach to consciousness, a men-
tal state M is conscious in virtue of another state that is about M. There
are different higher-order state views depending on how the higher-
order state at issue is specified. For instance, some philosophers hold
that it is an inner-sense perception of M (e.g. Armstrong, 1981; Lycan,
1996) while others argue that it is a thought about M (e.g. Carruthers,
2000; Rosenthal, 1997; 2005). Nonetheless, the different higher-order
theories have in common that M is conscious only if the subject, who
is in M, is aware of M.
Furthermore, Carruthers holds that ‘[m]ost higher-order theories of
phenomenal consciousness entail’ that the ‘access to our own experi-
ences’ that is involved in this awareness ‘is transparent, and radically
different from the sort of interpretive access that we have to the expe-
riences of other people. Indeed, this is believed by most people to be
an important mark in favor of the approach’ (Carruthers, 2011, p.
376).
142 U. PETERS
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 (
c)
 Im
pr
in
t A
ca
de
m
ic
 2
01
7
F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
--
 n
ot
 fo
r 
re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
Carruthers notes that the only exception is David Rosenthal’s
(2005) higher-order thought account. According to Rosenthal, as long
as the way in which a higher-order thought about M is produced does-
n’t involve any conscious inferences or interpretations, this will still
be sufficient to make M conscious.
But Carruthers responds that this view implies that ‘it is sufficient
for one to be undergoing a phenomenally conscious pain, say, that one
should come to believe that one is in pain on the basis of unconscious
inferences grounded in observation of one’s own circumstances and
behavior’ (Carruthers, 2011, p. 376). And this, he holds, is ‘extremely
hard to accept’ (ibid.). For the purposes of his argument, he thus
assumes that
if propositional attitudes are to count as conscious, according to a
higher-order account, then our access to those attitudes isn’t interpre-
tive, and must occur independently of beliefs about our own circum-
stances, behavior, and other mental states. (Ibid., p. 376)
Carruthers continues that if ‘conscious attitudes would have to be atti-
tudes that one knows of without relying on self-interpretation’,4 then
since the evidence suggests and the ISA theory of self-knowledge
implies ‘that the only way in which one can know’ of one’s own atti-
tudes ‘is by mindreading inferences’, i.e. by self-interpretation, it fol-
lows that there are no conscious attitudes on the higher-order state
approach (ibid., p. 378).
As it stands, however, this seems to conflate access to one’s own
attitudes with self-knowledge of them. As just mentioned, Carruthers
holds that, on the higher-order state account, attitudes that are the tar-
gets of a higher-order state can only be conscious if ‘our access to
those attitudes isn’t interpretive’ (ibid., p. 376, emphasis added). He
then points out that, given the empirical evidence and theoretical sup-
port for the ISA theory, ‘the only way in which one can know’ (ibid., p.
378, emphasis added) of one’s own attitudes is by self-interpretation
and concludes from this that there are no conscious attitudes on the
higher-order account. Unless access to one’s own attitudes is equated
with self-knowledge of them, however, this doesn’t follow.
If the two were identical and could be equated then there would be
no problem for Carruthers’ argument. But they need to be kept sepa-
rate. To begin with, self-knowledge of a belief that p requires a con-
ceptualization of the belief and a self-ascription with the content ‘I
believe that p’. Furthermore, self-knowledge and knowledge more
generally is, as Goldman (2006, p. 224) puts it, a ‘thick epistemo-
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[4] If not otherwise indicated, italics in the quotes of this paper are original.
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logical concept’ which refers to more than just attribution or belief but
also to justified true belief, or reliably formed true belief. In contrast,
access to the belief that p doesn’t require any of this. For instance, one
might have access to one’s own attitude without conceptualizing and
self-ascribing the attitude as such or at all. One way to specify the pro-
posal is by holding that one counts as having access to one’s own atti-
tudes when they are broadcast in the workspace; that is a first-order
view I discuss below.
Here are two higher-order state accounts of attitude consciousness
that specify this further.
One might hold that the higher-order thought that makes a first-
order attitude conscious doesn’t involve a conceptualization of the
attitudes as an attitude but rather takes the form ‘I am in that_’ —
where ‘that_’ is a mental demonstrative picking out a particular first-
order attitude without conceptualizing it as such.5 Since self-knowl-
edge of attitudes requires conceptualization of attitudes as attitudes,
and since a demonstrative higher-order thought doesn’t require that,
even if, as Carruthers holds, self-knowledge of attitudes is interpre-
tive in nature, it doesn’t follow that the formation of the demonstrative
higher-order thought requires self-interpretation also. Thus, there is a
higher-order thought account of attitude consciousness that is unaf-
fected by Carruthers’ argument.6
Furthermore, higher-order perception views of attitude conscious-
ness (e.g. Armstrong, 1981; Lycan, 1996) are not threatened by his
argument either. For perceptual states needn’t involve a conceptual-
ization of what is perceived. Similarly, a higher-order perception of an
attitude that makes the latter conscious needn’t amount to a conceptu-
alization of the attitude. That is, there could be higher-order aware-
ness of an attitude without self-ascription and knowledge of that
attitude. Since that is so, and since the ISA theory only pertains to
self-ascriptions (i.e. to awareness involving a conceptualization of an
attitude as a particular attitude), Carruthers’ argument against con-
scious attitudes doesn’t succeed.
It may be objected that the preceding discussion overlooks
Carruthers’ (2011, pp. 64–8) point that there is no independent ground
for assuming that there exists in addition to the mindreading faculty a
second mechanism that, unlike the mindreading faculty, produces
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[5] Lurz (2006) offers an account of conscious attitudes along similar lines but first-order in
nature.
[6] Some higher-order thought theories might require that a conscious attitude be an attitude
that is known to the subject non-interpretively. With respect to these higher-order thought
theories, Carruthers’ argument would still hold.
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higher-order states that don’t involve an attitude conceptualization. A
possible response here is that such a mechanism is more fundamental
and required to cause contents to be broadcast and widely available to
systems such as the mindreading faculty. I shall say more on this in the
next section.
For now, I conclude that once access to and self-knowledge of atti-
tudes are kept separate, Carruthers’ general claim that if the higher-
order state approach is combined with the ISA theory then this con-
junction of theories yields the result that there are no conscious atti-
tudes is false. There are higher-order state approaches that allow for
conscious attitudes even if the latter are only known interpretively.
2.2. Global workspace theory
But Carruthers’ point might still go through with respect to the second
account of consciousness that he considers, the global workspace
theory.
According to the global workspace theory (Baars, 1988; Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001), the mind is made up of specialist sensory and
conceptual systems that are connected to a ‘workspace’ in the prefron-
tal cortex of the brain. This is an area across which the systems can
broadcast their outputs. Any content that is broadcast in the work-
space is automatically accessible to and usable by all systems that are
connected to the workspace. It is via the workspace that memory,
motivational, and judgment and decision making systems exchange
contents and communicate.
The global workspace theory has been proposed as an account of
cognition as well as consciousness. On this view, a mental state is con-
scious if it is in the workspace. As Dehaene and Changeux (2011, p.
210) put it, the ‘global availability of information… is what we sub-
jectively experience as a conscious state’. And a mental state counts as
being in the workspace, if it is widely available to processes involved
in, for example, reasoning and decision making.
Given this, Carruthers argues that if there were conscious attitudes
on the global workspace theory then these attitudes would also have to
be states that are in the workspace and hence ‘globally accessible to all
of the main executive processes of the mind’ (Carruthers, 2011, p.
375). But, he continues, no attitudes ‘are ever globally accessible in
the mind-brain. For if they were, then of course they would be avail-
able as input to the mindreading faculty among other systems, and
they would thus be accessible to be known independently of any asso-
ciated sensory representations’, i.e. subjects should be able to know
SELF-KNOWLEDGE & ATTITUDES 145
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them directly, non-interpretively (ibid., p. 378). But the evidence sug-
gests and the ISA theory implies that attitudes are not non-inter-
pretively knowable. Thus, Carruthers concludes, there are no attitudes
in the global workspace, and there are no conscious attitudes accord-
ing to the global workspace theory (ibid.).
However, even if we accept that the mindreading faculty lacks
direct access to attitudes, it doesn’t follow that the latter aren’t in the
workspace. The additional assumption required here is that the mind-
reading faculty has direct access to all the states in the global work-
space. And this assumption can be challenged. One could hold, for
instance, that the faculty has access only to a particular subset of all
the states in the workspace, where attitudes are not in that set. One of
Carruthers’ (ibid., pp. 64–8) own considerations helps motivate this
view. He argues, for example, that the mindreading faculty evolved
specifically for the purpose of interpretively working out mental
states and only consumes contents required for that function — which
includes visual imagery, inner speech, perceptions of behaviour, etc.
but excludes a subject’s own attitudes.7 Given this, Carruthers’ infer-
ence from the faculty’s indirect access to attitudes to the claim that
there are no attitudes in the workspace can be rejected.
He does, however, offer other reasons against globally broadcast
attitudes that don’t directly pertain to self-knowledge of attitudes. He
argues, for instance, that all ‘of the evidence that has been accumu-
lated in support of global broadcast theory… concerns the global
broadcast of sensory information in the brain (together with concep-
tual information that is bound into the contents of sensory states, of
course)’;8 and no ‘evidence has been presented’ that attitudes, too,
‘can be globally broadcast, except by first being formulated into a sen-
sory image of some sort, such as a sentence of inner speech’
(Carruthers, 2011, p. 54).
One way to respond to Carruthers here and to argue for globally
broadcast attitudes involves appealing to the fact that at least some
attitudes are ‘inferentially promiscuous’, i.e. able to enter into various
inferential relations and interact with one another (Stich, 1978; Fodor,
2000; Evans, 1982; Brewer, 1999; Hurley, 2006). Since the inferential
promiscuity of attitudes requires them to be available to each other,
this property of them suggests that they can be broadcast in a
workspace.
146 U. PETERS
[7] Note that it does include mindreading domain-specific attitudes (Carruthers, 2011, pp.
53–4).
[8] See Carruthers (2011, p. 48) for details on what is meant by ‘bound into’.
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Carruthers anticipates this point. In reply, he holds that the inferen-
tial promiscuity of attitudes can be explained without assuming that
they themselves are able to enter the workspace:
[N]o propositional attitudes figure in the central workspace. Their
interactions with other such attitudes are always indirect, mediated by
processes that create sensory imagery of various kinds that can enter the
global workspace. (Carruthers, 2013, p. 3)
But how exactly are attitudes supposed to interact by means of
imagistic states? Carruthers insists that no such state can itself be an
attitude, for any imagistic state will lack the right functional profile to
be an attitude (Carruthers, 2011, pp. 102ff.). To illustrate, suppose
upon evaluating various hypotheses about the weather, you come to
entertain visual imagery of a rainy day and rehearse in inner speech
the utterance ‘It will rain today’. Carruthers concedes that these
imagistic states might resemble a judgment, but he claims that no such
states are judgments themselves. For judgments proper terminate the-
oretical reasoning on an issue and are directly available for action, yet
this doesn’t hold for any kind of imagery. You might, for instance, say
to yourself in inner speech ‘It will rain today’ even though you don’t
judge this to be so and won’t act in accordance with such a judgment.
Carruthers holds that further reasoning is required for imagistic states
to settle an issue and lead to action. In his view, what gives an
imagistic state, for example, ‘a belief-like’ as opposed to, say, ‘a sup-
position-like causal role will depend on one’s interpretation of its
nature’, i.e. it will depend on mindreading (Carruthers, 2013, p. 10;
see also Carruthers, 2011, pp. 102–17). Given this, attitude interaction
by means of sensory-imagery will then also require mindreading, for
‘sensory representations in general need to be interpreted in order to
be classified as involving one sort of mental attitude rather than
another’ (Fletcher and Carruthers, 2012, p. 13740).
3. Indirect Attitude Interaction and
Inferential Reasoning in Autism
Is Carruthers’account of attitude interaction plausible? As it turns out,
there is evidence that speaks against his proposal and provides the
basis for a positive argument for conscious attitudes.
Before going into the details, however, note that, as it stands,
Carruthers’ claim that interactions of ‘attitudes are always indirect’
and proceed by means of imagistic states (Carruthers, 2013, p. 3,
emphasis added) can’t be right if such states ‘in general need to be
interpreted’ (Fletcher and Carruthers, 2012, p. 13740). For the result
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of an interpretation of imagery is itself a judgment: a judgment pro-
duced by the mindreading faculty concerning the attitude underlying
the imagery. Since judgments are themselves attitudes, this judgment
could then, if the above general claim were correct, again only interact
with other attitudes by means of imagistic states (which again would
have to be interpreted, resulting in a further judgment, etc.). Attitude
interaction would become impossible. Since attitude interaction isn’t
impossible, it follows that some attitudes must be able to enter into
inferences and interact without first becoming expressed in interpreta-
tion-dependent imagery.
In other places (see Carruthers, 2011, pp. 53–4, 71), Carruthers in
fact grants the point that some attitudes can interact directly, and
restricts his claim only to attitudes that are widely available to judg-
ment and decision-forming systems. It is these attitudes in particular
that are only thus available in virtue of interpretation-dependent imag-
ery being broadcast in the workspace, he holds.
To assess this proposal, we first need to find a task that involves
widely available attitudes. Consider the following. Suppose you are
asked whether Jack owns more money than James, and engage in
explicit reasoning on the matter. Suppose that you know that (i) Jack
has more money than Jill, and also recall that a reliable friend told you
that (ii) Jill owns more money than James. Suppose you then infer that
Jack owns more money than James, give an affirmative answer to the
question, and mention the beliefs (i) and (ii) as reasons for your
answer.
To answer the question, you have to draw a transitive inference
from the beliefs (i) and (ii). These beliefs thus interact with each other.
But are they plausibly viewed as being widely available?
It might be pointed out that animals such as rats, pigeons, and pri-
mates are able to perform transitive inferences too (Davis, 1992; von
Fersen et al., 1991; Wynne, 1995), and that this suggests that these
inferences don’t require cognitive sophistication. Perhaps they don’t
depend on widely available attitudes or the broadcast of them in the
workspace.
However, note that in the example above you also invoke the beliefs
to justify your judgment on and answer to the question concerning
Jack and James. Since they thus enter into personal-level processing
and underlie report, there is good ground to hold that the beliefs are
widely available and in the workspace.
148 U. PETERS
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On Carruthers’ view, however, only sensory-imagistic states (and
conceptual contents embedded in them)9 are in the workspace and atti-
tudes can only interact by imagistic states that need to be interpreted
by the mindreading faculty. If Carruthers is right then subjects who
have an impaired mindreading faculty and fail at ascribing attitudes
should not exhibit normal performance in tasks that require reasoning
along the lines just mentioned.
This prediction turns out to be false, however. Consider autism. A
number of studies have shown that people with autism tend to fail at
ascribing beliefs10 to themselves and others (Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Frith and Happé, 1999; Williams, 2010). Yet, there is evidence that
they perform normally in tasks that require various kinds of first-order
reasoning (see, for example, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Scott et al.,
1996; 1999). For instance, Scott et al. (1996) gave autistic and a con-
trol group of children two tests. The first one required abstract reason-
ing involving transitive inferences (i.e. XY, YZ; hence XZ)
and analogical reasoning (e.g. X is to Y as P is to Q, etc.). The second
test that Scott et al. gave the children was a standard mindreading task
(the Sally-Anne test, see Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wimmer and
Perner, 1983) in which subjects had to attribute a false belief to
another agent. As it turned out, most autistic children failed in the
mindreading task. This suggests that they lacked an understanding of
belief as a representational state underlying a subject’s action. Such
understanding is required for correct other- as well as self-ascriptions
of attitudes. Interestingly, however, they ‘performed comparably to
the control groups, both on a test of transitive inferential reasoning
and on a test of analogical reasoning’ (Scott et al., 1996, p. 235). Note
that after each answer to one of the questions in the reasoning test,
Scott et al. also asked the children for a justification for their answer.
This was to ensure that they were not merely guessing but actually
engaging in inferential reasoning. Scott et al. found no significant dif-
ference between the justifications that the autistic children and the
controls provided for their answers.
Since the reasoning that Scott et al. tested required making connec-
tions between several beliefs, and since the autistic subjects were able
to justify their subsequent judgments by mentioning the contents of
SELF-KNOWLEDGE & ATTITUDES 149
[9] In what follows I shall use the term ‘sensory-imagistic state’ to include both kinds of con-
tent, i.e. imagistic contents, which might be non-conceptual, and conceptual information
that is bound into the contents of imagistic states.
[10] This is not to say that all of them do. High-functioning autistic individuals might be able to
ascribe beliefs correctly. But note that even they appear to employ a different strategy to
do so than normal subjects do (Frith and Happé, 1999).
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these beliefs, the results provide good ground to believe that the latter
interacted with each other and were widely available.11 Furthermore,
since these subjects exhibited a lack of understanding of beliefs and
hence a defunct mindreading faculty, Scott et al.’s findings speak
against the view that widely available attitudes can only interact by
imagistic states that are interpretation- (and hence mindreading-)
dependent. That is, Scott et al.’s results speak against Carruthers’
view of attitude interaction.12
Could it be that the attitudes at issue interacted by imagistic states
that didn’t have to be interpreted? There are two points to note about
this suggestion. First, if attitudes could interact by imagistic states that
needn’t be interpreted for their underlying attitudes then since the
mindreading faculty has non-interpretive access to one’s own imagery
(Carruthers, 2011, p. 2), these imagistic states should also give the
faculty non-interpretive access to attitudes by means of these states.
Carruthers wishes to deny non-interpretive access to attitudes, how-
ever. The suggestion under consideration is thus not available to him.
Second, if attitudes interacted by imagistic states that needn’t be inter-
preted then these states would lead directly to inferential transitions,
judgment- and decision-formation, etc. just as beliefs and other atti-
tudes do. That is, they would at the personal level play the same func-
tional role as attitudes and there would be little reason to deny that
they qualify as attitudes themselves.13 Note that if (occurrent) atti-
tudes are imagistic states, they could be in the workspace even if one
held that on the currently best-supported account of global workspace
only sensory-imagistic states are broadcast in the workspace.
In sum, then, findings on reasoning in autism suggest that attitudes
are at least sometimes directly available to various judgment- and
decision-forming systems and broadcast in the workspace even when
a subject lacks an understanding of attitudes that is required for self-
ascriptions and self-knowledge of them. If we assume the global
150 U. PETERS
[11] It might be objected that if autistic subjects did indeed have widely available attitudes then
they should exhibit at least normal performance on executive function tasks, i.e. on tasks
that require inhibiting responses and updating beliefs/desires in the light of new informa-
tion, but in a number of studies it has been shown that autistic subjects have clear execu-
tive function deficits (see, for example, Gioia et al., 2002; Geurts et al., 2009). However,
note that flexibility in thought, i.e. revising beliefs with new evidence, is one thing; their
being widely available for reasoning, verbal report, etc. is another. For all we know, in
autistic subjects, the mechanism responsible for revising beliefs in light of new informa-
tion might be dysfunctional even though their beliefs are still widely available and used in
first-order reasoning tasks.
[12] The autism data also challenge Frankish’s (2012) dual-attitudes account, for the latter
involves a commitment to higher-order beliefs (see Frankish, 2012, p. 47).
[13] But see Frankish (2012) and Carruthers (2013) for further discussion on this point.
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workspace theory of consciousness, this supports the view that there
are conscious attitudes14 even in cases when a subject doesn’t have an
understanding of them. The view that subjects come to know their
own attitudes only by self-interpretation (or not at all) thus doesn’t
undermine the existence of conscious attitudes on the global work-
space view.
4. Conscious Attitudes and Logical Reasoning
There is a second set of studies that further support the view that there
are conscious attitudes. The studies concern logical reasoning under
cognitive load in normal subjects.
To a first approximation, suppose that only non-attitude states (e.g.
sensory-imagistic states) are conscious and that attitudes are always
unconscious. If this were so then keeping a subject’s unconscious
thoughts occupied during a task that requires attitude interaction
should negatively affect the performance in that task. Personal-level
logical reasoning that is involved in solving symbolic logic puzzles,
for instance, requires moving from suppositions and beliefs to judg-
ments. It thus involves attitude interaction and should be negatively
affected by the mentioned manipulation.
There is evidence against this prediction, however. DeWall et al.
(2008) conducted a study that required subjects to solve logic puzzles
under different cognitive load conditions. In one condition, DeWall et
al. impeded conscious processing by asking subjects to solve the puz-
zles and simultaneously count the word ‘time’ in a song that they were
listening to during the task. As it turned out, the subjects performed
significantly worse than no-load controls. This suggests that con-
scious processing is required for logical reasoning. In a second and
here more relevant condition, DeWall et al. then manipulated non-
conscious cognition during the reasoning task. The procedure they
used was based on Wegner’s (1994) ironic processing theory, which
concerns the cognitive process that allows subjects to deal with
unwanted thought contents by suppressing them. According to the
theory, thought suppression has two components. It involves a non-
conscious monitor that keeps track of cues that might evoke unwanted
thoughts, and a conscious suppression mechanism. Crucially, Wegner
found that the non-conscious monitor keeps scanning the subject’s
thoughts for unwanted cues even after the subject’s conscious atten-
tion is turned elsewhere. In some cases, when the resources of the
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[14] As noted above, for present purposes, access conscious attitudes suffice.
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conscious suppression mechanism are depleted, this has the ironic
effect that the unwanted thought contents occur in the subject’s con-
sciousness more frequently than before (ibid.).
Building on Wegner’s theory, DeWall et al. used thought suppres-
sion to manipulate unconscious processing. They had their test sub-
jects think of an ‘old flame’, a former relationship partner, and then
instructed them to stop thinking about him or her. This freed up the
subjects’conscious processing so that they could solve logic problems
while the unconscious monitoring system was still engaged with
thinking about the old flame. That the unconscious system was indeed
occupied throughout was verified by a post-task measure that showed
that the thought of the old flame remained highly accessible after the
logic problems.
The results of the experiment were that subjects whose non-con-
scious processing was impeded with suppressed thoughts about an old
flame didn’t perform worse than no-load control subjects. In fact, the
non-conscious load subjects solved more logic problems correctly
than subjects in the no-load control condition. These findings contra-
dict the prediction that non-conscious load would impede logical
reasoning.
But even if the thought suppression task didn’t negatively affect
logical reasoning, it might still be that logical reasoning was per-
formed by an unconscious system that is isolated from the processing
involved in unconscious thought monitoring.
However, if there were an unconscious system preforming logical
reasoning then we would expect that priming subjects with logic-spe-
cific terms should positively affect performance in the reasoning task,
for this should activate and prepare the system before the task. DeWall
et al. (2008) tested this further prediction. They found that, while
non-conscious activation of the idea of logical reasoning did increase
the activation of logic-relevant concepts, it did not improve the sub-
jects’ performance. In fact, DeWall et al. noticed a trend that subjects
who were not logic primed were doing better on the reasoning task
than those that were primed.
Taken together, the findings just reviewed support the following
indirect argument for conscious attitudes. If there were no conscious
attitudes then attitudes would have to interact unconsciously. If they
could only interact unconsciously, then, since logical reasoning
involves attitude interaction, logical reasoning would involve uncon-
scious attitude interaction. Given this, impeding unconscious thinking
in a logical reasoning task should negatively affect task performance,
and priming the subject for logical reasoning should positively affect
152 U. PETERS
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it. However, the results of DeWall et al.’s study speak against both of
these predictions and thus suggest that at least some attitudes (those
involved in logical reasoning) are conscious.
5. Conclusion
Carruthers holds that the conjunction of (i) the view that self-knowl-
edge of attitudes is interpretive, and (ii) either of the ‘two broad possi-
bilities for accounting’ for conscious attitudes (i.e. the higher-order
state approach and the global workspaces theory) implies that there are
no conscious attitudes (Carruthers, 2011, p. 374). I showed that this is
not the case, for the two accounts of consciousness don’t require that a
conscious attitude be one that is non-interpretively known to the sub-
ject. I argued furthermore that studies on reasoning in autistic and con-
trol subjects provide positive grounds for believing that there are
conscious attitudes.15
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